WebWhile agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather … Webnilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e t 1:445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both …

Tight Incentive Analysis on Sybil Attacks to Market Equilibrium of ...

WebThe incentive ratio measures the utility gains from strategic behaviour. Without any restrictions on the setup, ratios for linear, Leontief and Cobb-Douglas exchange markets are unbounded, showing that manipulating the equilibrium is a worthwhile endeavour, even if it is computationally challenging. Such unbounded improvements can be achieved even if … WebAbstract In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and … desk with tall hutch top

How Pro table are Strategic Behaviors in a Market?

WebOur main results are the following, which bound the incentive ratios of linear andCobb-Douglasmarkets. Theorem. Foranylinearutilitymarket,theincentiveratioislessthan2;and … Webcommodities, but it may exceed the upper bound from Fisher markets, which we show by means of an example. The results obtained show a sharp contrast with the findings in [7], [6]: in the Fisher market setup, incentive ratios are bounded by the small constants 2, 2 and e1/e ≈ 1.44 for linear, Leontief and Cobb–Douglas markets, respectively. Websizes. Potentially, the concept incentive ratio can have applications in other strategic settings as well. 1 Introduction Market equilibrium is a vital notion in classical economic theory. Understanding its properties and computation has been one of the central questions in Algo-rithmic Game Theory. For the Fisher market model [7], we consider ... chucks ingersoll menu